Lundy’s Account

The recollection of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Lundy. [1]

Lundy's Account - The recollection of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Lundy

Lundy’s personal account is based on evidence contained in two documents within the papers of the Leslie family, the Earls of Leven and Melville, in the National Archives of Scotland. The first is The case of colonel Robert Lundie Humbly offerd to their Majties and Both houses of ParliamtBased on an account signed by Lundy and presumably in his own hand in the National Archives in London (TNA SP 34/8 ff.92r-94r), this account was written by another individual based on information provided by Lundy.  This account can reasonably be assumed, given its title, to have been presented to Parliament and to King William & Queen Mary on Lundy’s behalf during his incarceration.  The second document is entitled The Account of Coll: Robt Lundies proceedings in Irland since the 13 day of December 1688.  Comparing this with the document in Lundy’s hand in the National Archives it can also be assumed not have been written directly by Londonderry’s former Governor.  Like The case of colonel Robert Lundie, it is written in the first person.  Considering both documents side-by-side, it could be assumed that the information contained in The case of colonel Robert Lundie is essentially a distillation of what is included in The Account of Coll: Robt Lundie as the material in both is remarkably similar, indeed, largely identical.  That The case of Robert Lundie would have been considered by both Houses of Parliament and William & Mary rather than The Account of Coll: Robt Lundie, is the reason that is forms the basis of this evidential file.  However, the folio suddenly stops after the twelfth page.  After some investigation and communication with the National Archive of Scotland it can only be determined that the rest of this document has been missing for quite some time.  Therefore this evidential file starts by considering the material laid down in The case of Robert Lundie, supplementing it with information contained in The Account of Coll: Robt Lundie after it prematurely ends.

In The case of Robert Lundie, Lundy complained ‘after having patiently undergone months Imprisonment without being sensible of the least guilt’, and after having ‘permitted all my Enemyes to vent their utmost mallice in representing me according their various ffuryes I hope it will not be esteemed the least presumption either to their Maities or the Parliamt if I presume to informe them of the true state of my case’.  Lundy exuded his confidence of proving his innocence having ‘not the least doubt of their absolving me and scarsely question but I shall receive some reward ffor being the principall if not the Instrument under God of preserving Londonderry to them’.

Lundy began his recollection by reminding Parliament of how he first came to Londonderry alongside Lord Mountjoy after the earl of Tyrconnell learned that the inhabitants of the city had shut the gates to prevent the earl of Antrim’s regiment of Redshanks from garrisoning themselves inside the walls.  In response, Tyrconnell sent Mountjoy and Lundy at the head of six regiments to retake control of the city.  Noting the alarm caused by rumours of a planned Catholic massacre of Protestants which originated in the Comber letter, Lundy stated that after much negotiation and ‘not wthout much difficulty’, the city’s leaders agreed to permit Lundy’s and Captain Stewart’s regiments inside the walls of the garrison.  Lundy agreed to purge and remodel Mountjoy’s other regiments to make them at least 50% Protestant, further promising that if he and his forces were recalled before 10 March they would ‘leave the town ffree as wee found it’, putting it back under the command of the Derry regiments.  He stated in his written defence that he reconstituted the regiments by the middle of January and thereafter brought them into the garrison where they carried out equal duties with the rest of the soldiery.

Lundy noted that one of the first duties he carried out after entering the city was to take an inventory of supplies and ammunition in the stores.  He also carried out a thorough inspection of the magazines, city walls and defences on the same day (22nd December 1689).  He found only four barrels of powder.  He also believed the walls to be ‘misirably out of repair and surrounded with dunghills nere as High as themselves’.  The habit of the inhabitants of throwing their waste over the walls in designated areas had the potential of allowing any attacking force an easy, if rather unpleasant point of access.  Lundy further discovered that there were no platforms for the cannons and that the carriages on which they sat were defective.  As a result on 24th December Lundy stated that he called a meeting of the Common Council, ‘where I represented the trew state of things which was that the Government were dilligently Arming all Papists without imploying one Prottestant which would designe them no good’.  Lundy continued by informing the Council that ‘I doubted not their procedings had given ofence and consequently the ffirst attempt was most likely to be upon that place’.  He commanded them to ‘looke to themselves’, and ‘provide against the worst’ which could only be done by raising a significant amount of money to ‘repayr what was defective in the place’, otherwise he firmly believed that the city would ‘on the ffirst Attaqe fall in to their hands’.  Therefore a group of ‘the most prudent men’ formed a committee to meet with Lundy daily to collect a voluntary subscription of 100l which he employed in clearing and repairing the walls, restoring platforms for mounting the city’s cannons, as well as refurbishing 500 decrepit gun barrels housed in the magazine.  Lundy then proceeded to form five new companies from the inhabitants in the city liberties which supplemented the six already inside the city walls, arming them with these restored guns.  He obtained further reserves of ammunition after learning that thirty barrels of powder had been stranded aboard a ship which had run aground at Strangford.  He subsequently dispatched two ships on 15th January 1689 and recovered fourteen barrels, significantly adding to the capability of his soldiers to defend the city from attack.

However he recognised the continuing limitations which would be put on the soldiers in Londonderry without further supplies of ammunition.  Accordingly he called another meeting of the Common Council and informed them that ‘all they had done was to no purpose without more ammunition’.  As a result they raised around 400l and sent a small vessel into Scotland.  Lundy wrote directly to Major George Arnot, Governor of Stirling Castle, a ‘worthy ffreind of myne…to whom I represented that except we had speedy succours of armes and ammunition we shold speedily ffall a sacrifice to the Irish who were arming themselves and began to prey upon the Prottestants’.  Lundy managed to procure a further 42 gun barrels and 500 matchlock muskets for the city’s defenders.  Lundy further sought other supplies, provisions and reinforcements by writing to the duke of Ormond, the earl of Clarendon, Admiral Arthur Herbert who commanded the Williamite Royal Navy and Major General and commander-in-chief of William’s forces in Scotland Hugh Mackay, ‘intreating them allto represent to his Highness the Prince of Orange the sad condition the Prottestants of Ireland were in telling them that without speedy release of men money and Ammunition they were all lost’.

On 16th January Lundy received a letter from the gentlemen of counties Antrim & Down who asked him to ‘enter into an Asosiation for preservation of the Protestant religion’.  Lundy stated that he ‘represented to them the imprudence of making such an open defyance to the Government’, believing they were in no condition to stand against any army ‘should wee provoke them to send one amongst us having neither ammunition nor arms to oppose them with’.  In The Account of Coll: Robt Lundie there is a slightly different account of the incident, with Lundy stating that,

we wer in a uery ill condition to provoke them so highly, wanting both ammunition and armes but at the same tym to be putting them selues in as good a condition for defence of them selues as was possible, but with little noise, for fear of bringing an Army amongst them befor they wer in any readynes to repalse them.

Though Lundy recommended that the local gentry and gentlemen and government of the city put themselves in the best condition for their own defence, the local leaders followed their own course, agreeing to conduct weekly meetings and to take measures privately for conducting their affairs.  At the first meeting the local gentry appointed Lundy Governor of the whole county of Londonderry.  He raised another three regiments of foot and one regiment of dragoons, with many of their commissioned officers being Protestants who had resigned from Mountjoy’s regiment after Tyrconnell had sought to remodel and Catholicise the unit in their commander’s absence.  The gentry and gentlemen of Tyrone also agreed to raise two regiments of foot and one regiment of dragoons, also making Lundy and Colonel Gustavus Hamilton joint Governors.  In Donegal, Gustavus Hamilton became sole Governor and raised three regiments of foot.

At the start of February Lundy noted how he received a letter from the earl of Mount Alexander informing him that the Irish were preparing to bring a ‘Great Army’ northwards and the earl thought there to be a ‘necessity to joyn all our fforces desiring to know which number I cold bring and what Arms and Ammunition I wold spare of which they were is extreme want’.  Lundy replied to the earl that ‘I wold not march to joyne him for ffear the Irish shold march directly to Derry’.  Instead ‘with all imaginable expedition’ he stated he would spare an expeditionary force and ‘two ffeild peeces and what ammunition I wold spare’.  He offered to go directly to Dungannon, ‘that being the onely pass into our northern Parts desiring his Lordship to possess himselfe of the other pass at Portadown where if I perceived the Irish shold design to attaque him I wold imediately march to his assistance’.  He also sent Captain Hamilton to command three troops of dragoons, six country companies and 500 detached red coats to Dungannon to ‘preserve the pass and to keep in the garrison of Charlemont which grew troblesome to the Protestants by frequent plundering by them of their goods and cattle’.

After his remembrance of his communiqués with Mount-Alexander, Lundy noted that he received a letter from Tyrconnell which asked him to immediately repair to Dublin.  He refused, accounting it to be a breach of the Articles of Agreement made with the inhabitants of Londonderry on 21st December 1688 which had allowed him and his soldiers inside the garrison.  Instead he wrote again to Ormond, Clarendon, Admiral Herbert and Major General Mackay to beg for supplies, money and reinforcements.  Painting a rather desperate and despairing canvas he complained of how,

desperat the condetion of Irland was without a speedy suply of men money amunition and arms for they wer then marching troops from all quarters to form one Army to send into the north, and ther was nothing but naked men to opose them.

He particularly desired that he be sent general officers to command the locally raised regiments as they,

began to be werry of the trade and said they could not do deuty without subsistence, and we had no money to giue them, and they wold do but what they pleased, for officers had no comishons nether was ther marshall law to punish. Let the crime be what it would.

It became increasingly clear to Lundy, a professional soldier, that the locally trained militia were ill disciplined and liable to cause his authority significant problems.  This was only reinforced on 11th or 12th of  March when Lundy received a letter from Sir Arthur Rawdon which informed him that ‘at the sight of a few troups of the uanguard of the Irish Army commanded by Lt Gen: Hamilton, that all his party that was with him ran away and left him at Drummore, and at the sight of them thos at Lesnegarvey run and thos of Hillsburagh the same with out seeing ane enemy’.  The remnants of the eastern regiments had retreated straight to Coleraine ‘in the greatest consternation and confusion imaginable, and that many of the oficers had gon of for England and Scotland’.  Undoubtedly this was a disaster for Protestant forces in eastern Ulster.  Prior to receiving this news Lundy had sent some troops to garrison Dungannon ‘wher a grait stor of meall was layd in the Castle for the men’.  Lundy immediately altered his order, sending an express letter for these men to go instead straight to Coleraine and wrote to Captain Stewart, Governor of Dungannon, to draw his entire force, minus an officer and forty or fifty men to hold the castle, and go to Coleraine.  At the same time however, Lord Blayney’s force came to Dungannon from Monaghan on their way to the east of the province.  The garrison at Dungannon feared that Armagh and Glaslough had been lost to the Jacobites and as a result ‘not on man wold stay at Dungannon, and without mor to do for the most part desperted of them selves to ther severall homes so that all of his party he [Captain Stewart] had only his red cotts’, with the country forces effectively refusing to serve.  On the same night Lundy wrote to Rawdon that he would meet him at Coleraine, expressing his regret for his ‘misfortunate and cowardis of his men’ who had abandoned him at Dromore.  He then ordered Captain George to march the next morning with his troop and secure the bridge at Portglenone, ‘a graite desapointment to the enemy for they had no way left but through Coleraine’.

Realising the potential to bottleneck the Jacobite force, Lundy called the committee charged with managing the defence of Derry, informing them ‘that now our bulwark as we lookt upon them of Down and Antrim was brok it was tym to look to our selues and layd down ways how we get in provisions of all kynds in our stors’.  He continued his assessment that ‘for money we had non but severall letters from England ther was a report of 30000 pund cuming over in a short tym, upon the hopes of which I had 4 knowen men to be store keepers’.  He further ordered proclamations be executed,

by the beat of the drum through the town and afterward nailed up on the pillar of the town house, praying and desiring all people to bring in all kynds, and they should haue publique faith for it to be payed out of the first muney that cam ouer.

He informed civic leaders of the absolute necessity to pull down houses and buildings surrounding the garrison, ‘other ways the place could not be keept, for the enemy might com at pleasure and lodge themselues in cover within ten yeards of the walls’.  He further ordered that a ‘ravelling must be mad out at Bishups gate which was the weakest place of the towne considering the high ground that was without it’.  This was approved of and the next morning the ground was marked out and Lundy ordered men to start pulling some houses down and appointed several officers to oversee the work.

After overseeing these defensive works, Lundy and Colonel Gustavus Hamilton rode for Coleraine.  They met Sir Arthur Rawdon who was heading to Londonderry and persuaded him to change his course and accompany them towards Coleraine.  On arrival Lundy called all the officers together and empathised with their despair, stating he was ‘very sorry for ther desastare’, and that ‘although a stranger to them all’, he thought it an absolute necessity that,

the scatred and broken forces should be drawen to gither that ther numbers might be knowen and formed in to companies and batalions and oficers appointed to comand them, for of nine Regiments that cam from Down and Antrim, only 2 collonells cam with the men’.

He informed them that men from Derry, Donegal and Tyrone ‘wer on the march to joyn with them’, and when supplemented with Lord Blayney’s force,

we wold make a considerable body of men, that Colrain was a good post and easie to be keept considering ther number and the strenth of the place, that a good gareson shuld be put in Colraine; and the rest should pas the ban water and quarter as convenintly as they could along the river as well for the convenincy of subsisting, as to be drawen to gither at ane hours warning, ether to opose the enemy if they indeavored to pase the River by boate, or to serve Colraine if it wer ataqued.

Lundy attempted to put Coleraine into a solid defensive footing.  He even stated that the inhabitants, soldiers and officers were so thankful for his efforts that they tried to persuade him to stay on as Governor of the town.  He politely refused, instead offering Gustavus Hamilton in his stead which met with their approval and gratitude.  This apparent acquiescence did not last long for some subaltern officers and almost all their men ‘began to be very troublesome, saying they wer betrayed by their oficers, and in ther madness drew up ther draw bridge against me, and presented ther armes at me’.  Lundy tried to calm the situation, asking them to put down their arms and explain their actions.  However he ‘could get no satesfactory answer’.  Lundy noted that as a result ‘I was forced to stay all that day to get them pasefyd, for I neuer saw such desorder and destracion, for euery body was running up and down lyke mad men’.  The next day they remained in arms and ‘still mutenuse’.  He therefore resorted to have Sir Arthur Rawdon place a guard of his men to the bridge so that he would not be prevented from leaving the garrison.  Later that night, with great difficulty, he left the town and returned to Derry.

He certainly did not leave with a positive impression of much of the force that was to defend the town.  Nonetheless on 15th March Lundy called all the noblemen and gentlemen of Co. Londonderry together.  He noted that conditions in the garrison were becoming more difficult.  He informed them that ‘the town then was ueryf ull for after the brek of Drumore every body thought of saving themselves’.  Lundy ‘layd before them the sad condition of the Protestants of Ulster who now all drove to Colraine and Derry by the Enemy’, emphasising the necessity of ‘oposing ther farther progress at Colraine, other ways they might be at our gates in four days’.  He pleaded with his audience to raise a sum of money in order to help the garrison at Coleraine for the ‘finishing ther rampars and subsisting the men, for nothing could be expected from them without pay as they told me for they wold not venture ther lives to preserve ther landlords estates for nothing’.  With some difficulty they raised 400l, with 300l immediately dispatched to Colonel Hamilton at Coleraine.

Lundy was not entirely convinced that the garrison at Coleraine would prove to be an effective defensive base.  He therefore continued his efforts to put Londonderry into as sound a position as he could.  Despite his earlier proclamations for inhabitants to bring in food to the city’s stores, they remained largely empty.  Lundy immediately responded, ordering all merchants in the city to bring all the ‘salmond haring butar chise for saile’ to be put into the city’s stores.  He also wrote several letters to ‘the gentlemen of the country to oblidge ther tenants to send in all the grain that they could on the publike faith, other ways they wold lose it’.

The next day Lundy received a letter from Captain James Hamilton aboard The Jersey informing him he had brought arms, ammunition and money for the relief of Derry, though he had instructions not to hand them over until the garrison had taken an oath of allegiance to the monarchs.  The next morning Lundy, ‘had all the people of quality and oficers of town assembled and tendered them the oath in the after noon.  I had ther Majestys proclamed King and Queen wth all the solemnety that the place or the shortnes of tym could aloue’.  Hamilton then landed the arms and ammunition and distributed ‘as far as they wold go’.  However Lundy claimed that 600 of the 1,600 arms were defective, especially the matchlock rifles, adding that ‘this supply did much mor hurt then good ffor they wer in great expecktasion of hauing had much mor for the 30000 punds they expected was not quite 600’.  Lundy stated that this ‘bred a great deal of ill blood and made many leaue the kingdome that had no thoghts of it before then’.  Lundy’s inference was clear- the lack of material support from England put the defence and survival of Londonderry at stake.

After also receiving his commission from the King to be Governor of Derry, Lundy wrote to the earl of Shrewsbury, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, laying out his case and need for further material support.  He stated ‘as pressingly as I could the great desapointment we had met with in our suplys and gave him a true account of our sad condition assuring him that without a present supply of muney, arms and general oficers to command all most ineuetably fall a pray in to the Irish hands’.  He especially pointed to the soldiers under his command who ‘wer neglegent and wold do nothing, nether could we punish them having no muney to make them subsist’.  It was becoming increasingly worse as Derry became a refuge for people from all over the province who had been driven from their homes by the Irish.  Worse still, many of those who arrived in the city were malcontented and threatened Lundy’s authority in the city.

Lundy also sent 20 barrels of powder to Coleraine which he stated arrived just in time to aid the defence of the town against the Jacobite army under Colonel Richard Hamilton.  On 27th March, Lundy sent further guns and provisions to Coleraine, further helping the garrison defend itself from Hamilton’s initial attack, with the Irish suffering many more casualties than the defenders.  As a result Hamilton switched his attention to Portglenone, believing that the bridge over the River Bann was undefended thus permitting the encirclement of Coleraine.  However 700 of Lundy’s men defended the area under the command of Sir Arthur Rawdon and Colonel Edmondston.  Edmondston had carried out some impressive defensive preparations, including building trenches that were impervious to fire from across the river.  The two forces engaged each other across the river for two days, but five or six boats evaded Colonel Skeffington’s outposts and threatened to encircle Edmondston’s forces.  Outnumbered and outflanked, the Jacobites soon won the day.  Worse for Lundy, Rawdon’s force lost two captains including James MacGill who was shot from his horse, run through several times with a grenadier captain’s sword, and then had his head caved in with a club.  ‘This put the rest of the men in sucth consternation that without mor consideration they of them selues in stad of going to force back that party run straght to the walls of Londonderry’.  Colonel Gustavus Hamilton held a Council of War at Coleraine and it was resolved to leave the town ‘cutt the bridge and march to Derry before their comunecasion was cut by the enemy’.

‘If my trouble was graite befor…’ wrote Lundy, ‘…it was much mor now’.  The soldiers and inhabitants who abandoned Coleraine arrived in their droves in ‘sucth a consternation that they lookt lyk people beraved of their sences.  in spight of all my indevors the town was full of them’.  Lundy drew together a further nineteen companies, using them to strengthen the Londonderry garrison.  He also provided them with provisions and money for their subsistence,  putting further pressure upon the meagre stores of food.  He then wrote another letter to the earl of Shrewsbury which highlighted the desperate condition of the garrison.  He noted that the soldiery were ‘downright mutenous and wold do no thing but what they plased.  I begd a Generall and Army and provisions might be forthwith sent to the relife of Irland otherways it wold be to late’.  Indeed he noted that Colonel Gustavus Hamilton was so ‘rebuted with the cowardice of the men that he wold stay no longer, a grait many followed his example and went of’.

Knowing that Londonderry would soon come under siege itself, Lundy sent for the city’s storekeepers to ascertain exactly how much provisions they had in the city stockpiles.  He discovered that two of the storekeepers had abandoned the town and their books and ledgers could not be found.  Even worse, ‘to my great surprise [I] did not find near the quantity of meal that I expected’.  Therefore he sought to enforce the collection of provisions from local inhabitant’s homes, ordering them to be brought into the stores.  The following morning Lundy sent orders to this effect to Lord Blayney, Colonel William Stewart, Colonel James Hamilton and Sir Arthur Rawdon to lead their regiments of horse and dragoons to bring in all the meal, oats and hay they could get in the country into the stores, leaving only what was required for the subsistence of local families.  Lundy noted that ‘this so insenced the cuntry against me that they said I was worse then the enemy could be, and from that minute buryed their graine under ground’.  While Lundy strove to create communal security and procure enough supplies to withstand a concerted siege, he found the inhabitants more concerned with their own personal condition than the fate of their fellow Protestants inside the city walls.  The Governor spent much of early April bringing in provisions against the wishes of the local populace, pulling down buildings in the suburbs, finishing the ravelin and generally putting the city in the best condition for its defence.  This included bringing in one of the guns from Culmore fort as well as supplies of salmon from Lord Massereene’s fisheries.  Lundy also wrote a third letter to Shrewsbury, again emphasising the need for money and officers for the city.

Lundy’s fears of the oncoming Jacobite threat were realised on 13th April when three squadrons of horse appeared on the other side of the river.  Lundy ordered a gun to fire upon them and the Jacobites immediately retreated.  He immediately called all the officers in the garrison together and attempted to foster some unity with a stirring speech.  He told them ‘we wer all driven to a little place wher certainly we must perish by famine.  If all stayed ther, ther numbers was so grait, that we had a good pas yet to defend which was the fine water, which had always been fattall to the Irish’.  He continued that ‘since that was out last stake, we aught to uenture all rather then sufer them to pas, that I wold go alongst with them in it, and in Gods name to tray our fortune in a bataille’.  This rousing oratory met with their approval, and he ordered that a proclamation be executed by the beat of the drum, calling for all those who could carry arms to rendezvous on Monday 15th April by ten in the morning between the Long Causeway and Lifford.

The following day Lundy received intelligence that Richard Hamilton’s entire army was on the march to Strabane.  He sent Colonel Stewart immediately to Lifford where he believed the Jacobite army would attempt to cross the Foyle.  Lundy’s attempts to cut off the Jacobite advance proved to be temporarily successful, as ‘the enemy mad severall shoes as it they wold attempt it, but the water was to high and he [Colonel Stewart] played them so hard with grait and small shot that they drew of in to Strabane only leaving strong guards’.  The next morning the Irish passed Strabane and made for Clady bridge, where Colonel Stewart had positioned his men to stop the Jacobites from crossing.  Lundy also ordered the rest of his force ‘to marcth thither with all speed and Lo Blayney Capt Coote and I and severall others put spurs to our horses and galouped thither’.  He noted that ‘befor we cam within a mille of the place we herd grait shooting which made us ride the faster.  In halfe a mille farther we cam aposite to most of the Irish army, then we heard them hallor and saw them beat their hattes.  On proceeding further they ‘plainly saw that our men was run away from the bridge and the regiment of guards posted on the other end of it firing very hard’.  Lundy witnessed two troops of the Irish horse entering the river, hanging onto the horses’ saddles, manes and tails.  With the level of the water so high, the Jacobites suffered some casualties from drowning, including Major Richard Nagle.  Furthermore those that did manage to cross the river had no dry powder or charges with which to attack Lundy’s force.  Nonetheless, many of the Derrymen retreated and Lundy sent an officer and small deployment to Balindrait bridge to attempt to stop the Irish advance.

Lundy dispatched a letter immediately to Londonderry ordering the guard to ‘shute their gattes and not suffer a man to enter which so incensed the rable’, that they believed ‘that I had sold them and the towne to King James for 17000 pound and swore to kill me’.  On his return to the garrison he ordered the gates be locked behind him to keep out many of the soldiers who fled from Clady. Lundy also received a letter from Colonel Cunningham, stating that he had arrived with two regiments of reinforcements.  Lundy immediately answered ‘and desired they might be landed with all expedition’ for he did not know how many of the Jacobites many have been making their way towards Derry’s walls.  However, on holding council with Major Tiffin, Captain John Lydon and Captain Cornwall, he learned many of the reinforcements were wary of landing and coming into the city as they did not want to be posted with ‘sucth men as wold not look the enemy in the face for he had herd of all ther cowardice’.  Major Tiffin also told Lundy that he was ‘mucth surprised to find Derry no stronger, for in England it was said to be one of the strongest places in the worlld and doubted it could withstand any enemy with cannon’.  The Governor stated that the garrison was in dire straits, especially if the reinforcements would not land in the city.  Lundy pleaded to at least receive the money and provisions he had long sought from England. However he was horrified to learn that Cunningham had brought neither. He called an emergency Council of War in the city with Colonels Cunningham and Richards, Lieutenant Colonel Hussey, Major Tiffin, Captain Cornwall and six local officers.  Cunningham asked the Governor what provisions he had left to feed and arm the garrison.  Cunningham commiserated, saying that ‘hew was very well acquainted with it for he had bein at school there besides severall tyms since he was a man, and that he never lookt upon it to be a place of strenth’.  Without much hope of gaining any additional supplies and provisions for the garrison, Lundy asked Cunningham and his officers to give their opinions on the likelihood of withstanding any attack from the Jacobites.

I desired to know all their opinions which was unanemuse, that considering the grait number of people that was in the town and the small quantety of prouisions that was in it, and that we have to expeckt non by Major Genll: Kirk, nor ane Army to our reliefe before the later end of Jun at the shoonest, and that the place was of no strenth, al these things considered, it was resolved and agreed upon that the place was not tenable against a well apointed vicktorious Army, and a formall seige which we dayly expeckted.

The Council of War, which did not contain many of the local commanders who previously advised the Governor, unanimously judged it best for the King’s authority and safety of his kingdoms that Colonels Cunningham and Richards and their regiments return to England ‘with as many oficers and soldiers as could be carried of besides, and that the towns people should make their owen termes’.

In his retrospective account Lundy acknowledged that there had been more supplies in the city, but he simply did not know this because the inhabitants had refused to bring them into the stores.  Lundy wrote that he later discovered that additional supplies were,

in marchants houses that had bein lodged ther by the people of the cuntry tat had been chased from their owen houses, who had brought it in for the support of them selues and famelly, but after the breke of Claudy bridge, the consternation was so graite, and the desorder and insolancy of the rable that entered the towne was so grait, that rather then sufer it, not only those that cam from the cuntry for sancktuary, but the marchants them selues, lost ther houses, shopes and all ther merchandise, besides the provisions.

The malcontented rabble who came to the city for refuge after a series of defeats for Protestant forces in the east of the province and Coleraine caused many of the inhabitants of Londonderry to flee to England and Scotland, leaving whatever provisions they had in their homes.  Ship owners and merchants made a great deal of profit in the process as many of those streaming out of the garrison paid high prices for their transportation.

Lundy refused to assume any responsibility for the lack of provisions in the garrison.  He believed he did all could, but the ill-disciplined nature of many refuges and soldiers undermined his authority in the garrison.  He stated, quite confidently,

If I am blamed for not having mor in the stors, I am shure its non of my faulte, for I apeall even to my enemys them selues, if ever a man took mor paines to get provisions, for I tryed both fair means and foull, and am sure I went fare beyond my instruscions, to get what I had, and I think considering the circumstances I was under without muney and authorety, I womder I got so mucth.

The mood in the garrison was becoming increasingly discontented.  At four in the afternoon on 19th of April, the day after the fleet carrying Colonels Richards and Cunningham and the reinforcements left for England, ‘the rable got togither’ and forced the keys to the gates from one Lieutenant Ash and opened the gates to the city.  One sentry was shot for daring to oppose them.  ‘Then the whole rable entered, ther desorders was uery grait’.  This occurred only a few nights after he discovered that after the defeat at Clady bridge, some of the elements that opposed him in the garrison had helped 500 of the rabble into the city by throwing ropes over the wall for them to climb up.  A further 500 of the rabble burst through an open gate the following morning when they were opened to let in hay and provisions.  Lundy attempted to intercede but was advised to remove himself from the streets ‘other ways I might expeckt to be afronted at lest’.  The sight of  Richards, Cunningham and the reinforcements leaving the city ‘put the whole town in ane uproar swearing they wold hang me for keeping them out of the towne and they war betrayed by me’.  That night they forced the keys from the Mayor, relieved the guards on duty, beat the drums calling every man at arms to beset Lundy’s house.  The next morning many of the commissioned officers who remained loyal to Lundy came to his home.  He informed them that he was,

very senseble of the afronte they [the rabble] put on me, but was sory that I was not in a condesion to resent it, since I had no comand ouer them but since they had taken sucth a groundles jeaulosy against me I was resolved from that minute to be no mor conscerned with them’.

Lundy further argued that he firmly believed that the rabble could not in all truth say he had betrayed them ‘for I leave the towne in a much better condesion then I found it to them’.

The commissioned officers sought to change his mind and pleaded with him to remain in the city as Governor.  Lundy refused stating ‘I neuer wold wher I had nothing but the name, which indeed was all, for they war under no command’.  When pressed again he replied, ‘if it wer put to my choice to except of the comand or to be shotte, I wold chuse the leatter rather as for my proceedings till that minute I defyd ther malice to lay other neglekt or treacthrey to my charge’.  It was a powerful riposte to anyone who believed him to be a coward and traitor.  Lundy believed that because so many of the defenders were non-commissioned and owed him no loyalty he simply could not control them as he would any other soldier under his command.

As the officers continued to plead with him, news reached Lundy that the Jacobite army was sight of the city.  Lundy took advantage of this distraction to go back to his house, taking officers from his own company ‘that wold not be concerned with the rable’.  He gathered provisions and ammunition and brought them into his house, resolving to make a final stand if need be and determined to ‘sell my life as deir as I could, for besides my owen strenth I had a good party in the town who war resolved to asiste me if I war ataqued’.  He was in this position of defence for four days before he could make his escape, ‘all that tym was I threatened with 100 kynds of death’.

After Henry Baker and George Walker were chosen to govern the civil and military affairs of the city in his stead, they came to visit him and assured him of their support and ‘how much they deteasted the rabells designe in taking away my life and they wold contrebut all they could for making my escape, which truely they did’.  On the evening of 20th April Walker advised Lundy that the best opportunity for him to leave was to disguise himself and his officers as a party of common soldiers and leave through a gate during a changing of the guard, ‘to prevent any accksedent that might happen to me’.  Lundy seized the opportunity, taking four officers with him and slipped out unnoticed as another party returned to the city.  Lundy’s party then took a small boat and travelled to Culmore Fort where he spent the night awaiting suitable transportation.  His misfortune did not end there.  The following morning he commandeered a ship belonging to Benjamin Adair, an officer in at Culmore fort.  Lacking seamen to man the five-ton ship or the provisions for the journey, they headed to Greencastle.  Not wanting to set sail on the open seas without a crew, Lundy and his party decided to drop anchor in a creek until the next morning.  However in the early hours an Irish raiding party attacked them.  Lundy’s men ‘seazed on of the furst of them who said he had once been in Scotland, and I rather then fall in to the hands of the Irish, set to sea in this manner’.  Lundy noted that the weather on their crossing was extremely stormy and his party were forced to use spare wooden boards and nails lying on the deck to raise the sides of the vessel to prevent it taking on too much water.

They arrived in Islay in the Highlands of Scotland ‘wher i met with ill usage enogh for they had got it ther that I had betrayed Derry’.  While sailing in the River Clyde a party boarded his ship to search for arms and any incriminating evidence of communication with the Jacobites.  Lundy was then sent to shore as a prisoner before being transferred to Dumbarton Castle where the Governor, Major Arnot, said ‘he wold answer for me’.  While at Dumbarton Lundy was warned that if he went to Glasgow ‘the weomen war resolued to tear me to pices’.  Instead he headed to Edinburgh ‘wher I was advised to keep my selfe out of the way, for every body was insenced against me’.  However the Scottish Council had him arrested and sent to London to the Tower.

Lundy then concluded his sorry tale by stating,

Now, if any body will take the trouble to reid ouer this acount which is all matter of fackt, which nobody can contradict, and which all the men of honour and qualety of that cuntry can atest, they will finde how hartly I haue bein in the cuntreys service these four months, and how mucth I haue toiled and travelled by night and by day and what charges I haue bein at, and that I neuer was master of my selfe 2 hours in all that tym, and what pains I took with the Gentlemen of the cuntry, to put themselues in a condetion of defence.

Writing in the bowels of the Tower he noted that ever since he received the King’s commission he had served him faithfully, stating that ‘I haue grived at the cowardes and ungouernablest of the men which was the ocasion of all our destraccions’.  Though he left Derry with great regret, he though himself utterly ‘frie of all treacthry and corospondance with King James’.  He even argued that if he was a closet Jacobite ‘I must be the graitest foole upon earth to haue com heir when I might so easily haue gon in to the Irish Army’.  He also poured scorn upon many of those who had given evidence a House of Commons Committee investigation into the ‘Occasion of the Delays in sending Relief over into Ireland, and particularly to Londonderry’.  He wrote that ‘not with standing I am secured and artikled against by litle pitefull people who I neuer saw on of in my life and they are belived, befor men of honour and qualety that ar redy to prove that all is meer malice’.  Lundy stated that all the while his reputation suffered ‘which is deirer to me then my life, for I am called papest, traytor or cowarde, which I thank god of false aspersions’.  Therefore he sought to clear his reputation and be brought to trial, and if found to be a traitor, then he would let justice take its course; otherwise he asked to be set at liberty.

[1] NAS GD26/7/37